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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Severe consequences to good faith possessors, should the
state demand a return of the products removed from water-
bottoms, could provide incentive for reversal of the instant
decision. If the court is willing to extend its fruits analogy to
others holding similar patents, that extension of equitable
relief would go far toward relieving the harsh results of a
decision that has finally corrected an aberration in Louisiana
property law. Hopefully the decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. State
Mineral Board will not fall beneath the pressures brought by
dissenting groups. Mere changes in the composition of the
court should not be relied upon at a later time to overturn a
decision bringing harmony to the law of navigable waterbot-
tom ownership. 53
Francis J. Crosby
PUTATIVE MARRIAGES: WHAT ARE "CIVIL EFFECTS"?
Two recent decisions by the Louisiana Supreme Court
highlight the difficulty traditionally attending determination
of the "civil effects" that flow to good faith spouses in a
putative marriage.' The difficulty arises in the courts' at-
tempts to articulate a difference between rights and duties
that arise solely as a result of a marriage contract and are
therefore "civil effects" and rights and duties that are per-
sonal and would exist regardless of the existence of a mar-
riage. 2 The supreme court's decisions in Cortes v. Fleming3
53. Chief Justice Fournet, after dissenting in Price, did, however, concur
in the denial of writs in Cenac, stating, "Indeed, there would be no stability of
title in this state if every time there is a change of the membership of this
court, previously adjudicated property rights are to be changed in accord
with the views of the individual members as newly composed." 241 La. at
1059, 132 So. 2d at 929. While this view has not been followed in overruling
the erroneous Price decision, hopefully the instant case will put an end to the
apparently endless controversy over Act 62 of 1912.
1. LA. CiV. CODE art. 117: "The marriage, which has been declared null,
produces nevertheless its civil effects as it relates to the parties and their
children, if it has been contracted in good faith."
2. Professor Pascal has noted that "by emphasizing 'civil effects' rather
than 'effects' in general, the articles imply that the purely personal rights and
obligations of the parties, as distinguished from the civil effects of marriage,
always cease with the declaration of nullity. . . ." R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA
FAMILY LAW COURSE 56 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PASCAL].
3. 307 So. 2d 611 (La. 1975).
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and King v. Cancienne,4 expanding the construction of the
term "civil effects" into new areas, significantly affect the
putative marriage doctrine in Louisiana.
Articles 117 and 1185 of the Louisiana Civil Code contain
the rules regulating the effects of putative marriages. A mar-
riage contracted in good faith by both parties but declared
null produces its civil effects as it relates to the parties and
children born of the marriage; if only one party is in good
faith, the civil effects flow only in that party's favor and in
favor of any children born of the marriage. These principles
emanate from a theory originally formulated in the canon
law,6 and the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825
drew from both French 7 and Spanish sources8 in drafting the
corresponding provisions of the 1825 Code.9
Louisiana jurisprudence has required both the perfor-
mance of a marriage ceremony and the good faith of at least
one of the parties before recognizing a null marriage as puta-
tive.10 Article 117, providing that a null marriage produces its
civil effects if contracted in good faith, is the codal source for
the ceremonial prerequisite. Although in one case the
Louisiana Supreme Court held the ceremony requirement
satisfied by a reasonable belief that a ceremony had taken
place,1" the majority of decisions have emphasized the neces-
sity of an actual marriage ceremony. 2
4. 316 So. 2d 366 (La. 1975).
5. See text of article 117 in note 1, supra. LA. CIV. CODE art. 118: "If only
one of the parties acted in good faith, the marriage produces its civil effects
only in his or her favor, and in favor of the children born of the marriage."
6. 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 1094 at 615-16 (12th ed.
La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
7. The wording for these articles comes verbatim from the French coun-
terparts in the Code Napoleon. Code Napoleon arts. 201-02 (1804); Succession
of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 797, 164 So. 797, 804 (1935).
8. The redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 noted that the
putative spouse provisions were conformable to the Spanish law. PROJET OF
THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, art. 10, 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES 10 (1939) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PROJET]; LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. 4, tit. 13, L. 1 (Scott transl.
1931).
9. PASCAL at 56-57; PROJET at 10; LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. 4, tit. 13, L. 1
(Scott transl. 1931).
10. See cases cited in note 12, infra. For a discussion of these two re-
quirements and the putative marriage in general, see Comment, The Putative
Marriage Doctrine in Louisiana, 12 LOYOLA L. REV. 89 (1967).
11. Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935).
12. E.g., Succession of Dotson, 202 La. 77, 88, 11 So. 2d 488, 491 (1942)
(O'Neill, J., concurring); Succession of Cusimano, 173 La. 539, 138 So. 95
1976]
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"Good faith" has been defined as the honest and reason-
able belief of a party that his marriage was valid. 13 Louisiana
courts have consistently held the issue of good faith a ques-
tion of fact to be determined ultimately upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.14 A party's good faith may be
founded on either error of fact or error of law.1 5 Once a party
claiming putative spouse status shows that a marriage cere-
mony took place, a presumption of his good faith arises which
must be rebutted by a party challenging that status.1 6
Having concluded that a putative marriage exists,
Louisiana's courts have asked whether the right sought to be
enforced can be properly classified as a civil effect of the
marriage. In the early case of Smith v. Smith1 7 the Louisiana
Supreme Court noted that the courts' broad application of the
term "civil effects" was an effort to give to the unfortunate
good faith spouse the ordinary effects of a valid marriage.
Pointing out the many rights and obligations that Louisiana
courts have held to be "civil effects which flow from [a] puta-
tive marriage,"' 8 the supreme court in Cortes v. Fleming'9
and King v. Cancienne20 recently also favored a broad con-
(1931); Succession of Rossi, 214 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
253 La. 66, 216 So. 2d 309 (1968); Succession of Theriot, 185 So. 2d 361 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 249 La. 464, 187 So. 2d 443 (1966).
13. Funderburk v. Funderburk, 214 La. 717, 723, 38 So. 2d 502, 504 (1949).
14. E.g., Succession of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 320, 29 So. 2d 860, 863 (1947).
15. E.g., Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935); Chand-
ler v. Hayden, 159 La. 5, 105 So. 80 (1925); Jones v. Squire, 137 La. 883, 69 So.
733 (1915); Succession of Buissi~re, 41 La. Ann. 217, 5 So. 668 (1889).
16. E.g., Succession of Navarro, 24 La. Ann. 298 (1872); Melancon v.
Sonnier, 157 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Howard v. Ingle, 180 So. 248
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
17. -43 La. Ann. 1140, 1149, 10 So. 248, 250 (1891).
18. Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611, 613 (La. 1975). See Kimball v.
Folsom, 150 F. Supp. 482 (D.C. 1957) (right of putative wife to inherit as a wife
in the succession of the husband); Smith v. Smith, 43 La. Ann. 1140, 10 So. 248
(1891) (right of the putative wife to the marital portion, when she is otherwise
qualified); Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98
(1846) (right of the putative wife to her proportionate share of the community
property); Jones v. Equitable Life Assuic. Soc'y, 173 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 247 La. 1019, 175 So. 2d 302 (1965) (right of the putative
wife to be considered as the "widow" under her husband's insurance policy);
Texas Co. v. Stewart, 101 So. 2d 222 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1958) (legitimacy of the
children); Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Fernandez, 159 So. 339 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1935) (right of the putative wife to claim workmen's compensation from
her husband's employer).
19. 307 So. 2d 611 (La. 1975).
20. 316 So. 2d 366 (La. 1975).
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struction of the putative marriage provisions of the Civil Code
in determining the civil effects of such a marriage. 21
However, Cortes and King also illustrate the difficulty in
determining what are civil effects of marriage. Cortes pre-
sented the question of whether "alimony is a civil effect of a
marriage which may be awarded the good faith wife as an
incident to an annulment proceeding" 22 when the husband
was in bad faith. Answering that question affirmatively,m the
Louisiana Supreme Court further noted that the Louisiana
Civil Code provides two additional bases upon which alimony
after annulment may be awarded to a putative spouse: a
right to compensation analogous to alimony awarded upon
divorce under article 160, and a right to damages for the good
faith spouse based upon article 2315.2
Despite a comprehensive discussion of the nature of
alimony and, more specifically, its characterization as a civil
effect of marriage founded upon the continuing duty of
spouses to provide mutual support,25 the court in Cortes con-
cluded by holding narrowly "that alimony is a civil effect of
the marriage in favor of a good faith wife of that putative
marriage when the other party is in bad faith. '26 Although the
court defined alimony as "the right of support or maintenance
... established at the moment of the marriage,' 27 its holding
curiously was limited to the one instance in which alimony
could most properly be characterized as a right of recovery
under article 2315, based on the other party's bad faith.28 As
21. 316 So. 2d at 371; 307 So. 2d at 613.
22. 307 So. 2d at 612.
23. "That the right of support or maintenance is established at the mo-
ment of the marriage and is an element of the obligations of the parties to
one another during the marriage, is clearly established by Civil Code Article
119. It is an effect of the marriage and it is a civil effect of the marriage upon
termination of a null marriage when one party is in good faith and the other
is in bad faith." Id. at 616.
24. "We can also, through analogy with Article 160, establish that
alimony is a civil effect going to the party in good faith in an annulment
proceeding. We can, without regard to Articles 117 and 118, base an award of
alimony to a good faith wife of a putative marriage in an annulment proceed-
ing when the husband is in bad faith upon Article 2315." Id.
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 119: "The husband and wife owe to each other
mutually, fidelity, support and assistance."
26. 307 So. 2d at 616 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. This limited holding is in accordance with the French concept of
alimony. There is, however, disagreement among the French doctrinal writ-
ers as to the codal basis for awarding alimony to the good faith spouse in a
1976]
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the court noted, this narrow result avoids the difficult ques-
tion of the propriety of awarding alimony when both parties
are in good faith29 and further sidesteps the issue of a good
faith husband's right of alimony based on the mutual duty of
support established by article 119. However, the court's re-
liance on article 119 to support its contention that alimony is
a civil effect of marriage would indicate that alimony should
rightfully be awarded in each of these situations.
A major problem involved in characterizing alimony as a
civil effect of marriage flowing to a good faith spouse under
articles 117 and 118 arises in providing for its continuance
beyond the termination of the spouse's good faith. In dealing
with effects of marriage such as the existence of a community
of acquets or gains, Louisiana courts, relying on the Spanish
laws to which the putative marriage articles conform,30 have
consistently held such effects of marriage cease once the good
faith spouse learns of the impediment to the marriage.3 1
Thus, if alimony is a civil effect of marriage, the putative
husband's duty to provide support for the putative wife under
Civil Code article 119 similarly should cease upon termination
of the wife's good faith.
Arguments for awarding alimony based solely upon the
provisions of article 16032 are also unpersuasive. Although
putative marriage. As the court noted in Cortes: "The [French] writers and
the courts have all reached the same results, i.e., awarding alimony to the
one party in good faith, but they differ as to whether this award comes as
damages under their code article 1382, our Code article 2315, or by analogy to
their code article 301, our Code article 160, or their code articles 201 and 202,
our Code articles 117 and 118." Id. at 615, and the authority cited therein.
29. Id. at 616 n.8.
30. See authorities cited in note 8, supra.
31. E.g., Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98
(1846); Clendenning v. Clendenning, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 438 (La. 1825); Succession
of Hopkins, 114 So. 2d 742 (La App. 1st Cir. 1959); Howard v. Ingle, 180 So. 248
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1938); Evans v. Eureka Grand Lodge, 149 So. 305 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1933).
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 160: "When the wife has not been at fault, and she
has not sufficient means for her support, the court may allow her, out of the
property and earnings of the husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-
third of his income when: 1. The wife obtains a divorce; 2. The husband
obtains a divorce on the ground that he and his wife have been living sepa-
rate and apart, or on the ground that there has been no reconciliation
between the spouses after a judgment of separation from bed and board, for a
specified period of time; or 3. The husband obtained a valid divorce from his
wife in a court of another state or country which had no jurisdiction over her
person. This alimony shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary, and termi-
nates if the wife remarries."
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this article authorizes the payment of alimony only to the
wife and can be invoked without regard to the husband's good
or bad faith, its location in the Civil Code chapter entitled "Of
the Effects of Separation From Bed and Board and of Di-
vorce" supports the view that article 160 alimony is indeed
"an effect, not of marriage, but of divorce. '33
A right of recovery under article 2315,3 based on the bad
faith of one spouse, provides the good faith spouse, either
husband or wife, a more logical basis for recovery upon the
annulment of a putative marriage. Although a right of action
under article 2315 is personal and should not be considered an
effect of marriage provided for by articles 117 and 118,3
5 it
does provide an effective vehicle through which a putative
spouse can recover for the damage he or she has suffered
through the partner's bad faith. 36
The term "civil effect" was expanded again in King v.
Cancienne, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly
overruled Vaughan v. Dalton-Lard Lumber Co. 37 and held that
the right of a surviving spouse to maintain a wrongful death
action was one of the civil effects of marriage. The inclusion
of the term "spouse" among the listed beneficiaries in article
2315 indicated to the King majority that this benefit was one
that existed as a result of the marriage relation and was
therefore a civil effect of marriage.38 The clearcut language of
the court's holding belies the difficulty involved in formulat-
ing a fundamental, rational test for distinguishing such civil
effects of marriage from other benefits or duties that accrue
to marriage partners because of their relationship but that
are not solely the result of the fact of their marriage. 39 Avoid-
33. 307 So. 2d at 617 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315: "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. .. "
35. The problem of continuing alimony beyond the termination of the
spouse's good faith is therefore not encountered. See text at note 30-31,
supra.
36. The common law provides a similar action based on the misrepresen-
tations of the deceitful partner. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 684 (4th ed. 1971).
37. 119 La. 61, 43 So. 926 (1907) (holding a putative spouse could not
maintain an action for wrongful death under LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315).
38. 316 So. 2d at 371.
39. See authority cited in note 2, supra. Although the Louisiana Supreme
Court based its decision on other considerations, the First Circuit Court of
Appeal, noting the similarity between the instant case and recent United
States Supreme Court decisions striking down Louisiana statutory class dis-
tinctions in the area of wrongful death, had stated that the lack of a rational
1976]
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ance of the conceptual difficulties in such a distinction could
have been the basis for Justice Barham's broad statement in
King: "Unless there is legal provision to the contrary, what-
ever benefit accrues to a legal spouse also accrues to the good
faith spouse of a marriage which has been annulled or which
is subject to nullity ....
Such broad construction of articles 117 and 118 will
necessarily produce problems. As noted in recent decisions, 41
dual payment problems are a definite possibility in several
areas. In statutory schemes such as workmen's compensa-
tion 42 and social security,43 both a legal wife and a putative
wife might be entitled to full benefit payments." A similar
problem could occur should both a legal and a putative spouse
claim the benefit of the legal usufruct provided by Louisiana
Civil Code article 916. 4 5 In wrongful death or tort actions, the
test for distinguishing a wrongful death action from a "civil effect" of mar-
riage could possibly be labeled an invidious discrimination. Thus, any such
distinction could be barred under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. King v. Cancienne, 303 So. 2d 891, 895 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1974). Cf. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (finding no
significant relationship between the inferior classification of unacknowledged
dependent illegitimate children and the recognized purposes of workmen's
compensation such as to justify a denial of equal recovery rights).
40. 316 So. 2d at 371 (emphasis added).
41. Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813, 817 (La. 1974); King v. Cancienne,
303 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
42. LA. R.S. 23:1251 (1950): "The following persons shall be conclusively
presumed to be wholly and actually dependent upon the deceased employee:
(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she is living at the time of his accident
or death . . ." (emphasis added).
43. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(b) (1970): "The term 'wife' means the wife of an
individual, but only if she (1) is the mother of his son or daughter, (2) was
married to him for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day on which her application is filed . .. ."
44. An early workmen's compensation case determined that although the
right to claim workmen's compensation benefits was a civil effect of mar-
riage, it would not be so construed if to do so would deny or lessen the
benefits of the legal spouse. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Fernandez, 159 So.
339 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935).
45. LA. CIV. CODE art. 916: "In all cases, when the predeceased husband
or wife shall have left issue of the marriage with the survivor, and shall not
have disposed by last will and testament, of his or her share in the commu-
nity property, the survivor shall hold in usufruct, during his or her natural
life, so much of the share of the deceased in such community property as may
be inherited by such issue. This usufruct shall cease, however, whenever the
survivor shall enter into a second marriage." When the bigamous spouse is in
good faith and there are children of both unions, problems could occur in
determining the portion of the community to be held in usufruct by each of
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existence of two "spouses," each asserting a claim to the
proceeds of the wrongdoer's liability insurance, could encour-
age increased litigation and make early settlement in such
cases impossible.
These potential problems, however, perhaps are out-
weighed by the difficulty involved in formulating a test for
determining the civil effects of a putative marriage. Justice
Barham's expansive language in King indicates that, in the
absence of a rational standard for making this determination,
the putative spouse shall be accorded the right of all of the
benefits enjoyed by a legal spouse, "civil effect" or not.
Ryland Percy
DIMINUTION OF PROPERTY VALUES AS COMPENSABLE
DAMAGE ABSENT FAULT OR PHYSICAL DAMAGE
Plaintiffs sued the owner of a high pressure gas pipeline,
operated within fifteen feet of their property, for $30,000
damage to property value due to the alleged danger resulting
from the proximity of the pipeline. The plaintiffs did not al-
lege negligent construction or maintenance nor make any
claims of actual physical damage or discomfort. The trial
court sustained defendant's exception of no cause of action
and the court of appeal affirmed. The Louisiana Supreme
Court held that allegations of diminution of property values
caused by the nearby presence of ultra-hazardous activities
state a cause of action under Civil Code article 667 even
absent assertions of physical damage. Hero Lands Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 310 So. 2d 93 (La. 1975).
Traditionally, recovery in Louisiana for non-physical
damage to property as a result of works or activities on
neighboring estates has been limited to cases in which a
neighboring proprietor was at fault, that is, guilty of negli-
gence, intentional misconduct or abuse of right.' Whereas
recovery under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 has encom-
passed both physical and non-physical damage, 2 recovery
the surviving spouses. Cf. Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1
La. Ann. 98 (1846).
1. See Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage:
Articles 667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L. REV. 195, 197 (1974).
2. See McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 184 La. 101, 165 So. 632 (1936)
(nonphysical damage).
1976]
